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Abstract
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in mul-
tidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We study mechanisms for selling
two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) de-
creasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the
two marginal values of the buyer are not independent. We obtain sufficient conditions
on the distribution of buyer values for the existence of an optimal mechanism that is
deterministic.
In the DMV model, we show that under a well-known condition, it is optimal to
sell the first unit deterministically. Under the same sufficient condition, a bundling
mechanism (which is deterministic) is optimal in the IMV model. Under a stronger
sufficient condition, a deterministic mechanism is optimal in the DMV model.
Our results apply to heterogenous objects when there is a specified sequence in
which the two objects must be sold.
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at Ashoka University, Delhi Economic Theory Workshop, Essex University, Penn State, and UCLA for
helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
We consider optimal, i.e., expected revenue maximizing, mechanisms for selling two identical
units of an object to a buyer. The buyer’s type (values for the units) is two dimensional
and privately known to the buyer. We focus on two cases: decreasing marginal values and
increasing marginal values. Thus, the buyer’s values for the units are not independent.
The assumption of homogenous objects reduces the dimensionality of the price space and
therefore the dimensionality of random allocation rules (compared to heterogenous objects).
While this represents a simplification of the problem of finding an optimal mechanism, the
dependence of values in our paper increases complexity. Moreover, the natural requirement
that the first unit is sold before the second unit adds a constraint to the feasible region.
A general solution to the optimal mechanism design problem for the sale of multiple
indivisible products is unknown. Unlike the single product case, the optimal mechanism for
selling two or more products may involve randomization (see Thanassoulis (2004), Manelli
and Vincent (2006), Pycia (2006), and Hart and Reny (2015)). Our objective is to find
sufficient conditions under which a deterministic mechanism is optimal among all mechanisms
for selling two identical units, including random mechanisms.
We assume that the seller can commit to a mechanism. Implicit in this assumption
is that the buyer can verify that the seller followed the mechanism that she committed
to. Verification is easier for a deterministic mechanism as it does not require access to a
randomization device that both parties regard as authentic. Perhaps this is a reason for the
limited use of randomized selling methods.1
With homogenous objects, there is a natural order of transactions: the second unit can be
sold only after the first unit is sold. Our results apply to the sale of two heterogenous objects
when one of the two objects can be sold only after the other object is sold.2 For instance, the
warranty on a product is only sold to a buyer who purchases the product. Another example
is when a seller offers two versions of a product, basic or premium. The premium version
of a product can be viewed as consisting of the basic version plus an upgrade. That is, the
upgrade is sold only if the basic product is also sold.
1Random selling methods – called opaque selling – are used by travel websites such as Hotwire and
Priceline.
2See Armstrong (2016) for a discussion of this issue.
1
A function of buyer marginal valuations, Φ(v1, v2), plays a key role in the analysis.
3 The
function Φ acts as a guidepost for making revenue improvements to any incentive compatibile
and individual rational mechanism. If Φ satisfies certain single-crossing conditions, then
incentive compatibility and individual rationality is maintained in the improved mechanism.
The function Φ depends only on the distribution of types and not on any specific mechanism.
With decreasing marginal values, we show that if Φ satisfies single-crossing in the hor-
izontal direction (which corresponds to changes in v1 only), then there exists an optimal
selling mechanism in which the first unit is sold deterministically. We refer to a mechanism
in which the first unit is sold with probability 0 or 1 as a line mechanism. Line mech-
anisms are completely described by the payment for the first unit and the probability of
allocating the second unit to types on the vertical line (1, v2), 0 ≤ v2 ≤ a. The resulting
simplification allows us to precisely describe the restrictions placed on line mechanisms by
optimality. Next, if Φ satisfies single-crossing in the vertical direction (which corresponds to
changes in v2 only) then there is an optimal mechanism which is semi-deterministic, i.e., a
line mechanism with at most one probabilistic value for allocating the second unit. Finally,
if Φ satisfies diagonal single-crossing (along the diagonal boundary of the support of the
distribution) then there exists an optimal mechanism that is deterministic.
Our results for increasing marginal values are under weaker conditions, in that single-
crossing of Φ in the horizontal direction is sufficient for the existence of an optimal mechanism
that is deterministic. In this optimal mechanism, the two units are bundled together and
sold at a take-it-or-leave-it price.
While decreasing marginal values is a common assumption, there are scenarios where
marginal values are increasing. For instance, if the buyer is unfamiliar with the product and
incurs a learning cost before using it, the marginal value for the second unit may be higher
than the marginal value for the first unit. Alternatively, if there is a fixed cost of production,
then the model resembles increasing marginal values. As described later, increasing marginal
values also obtain when a buyer might consume the good over one or two periods.
We provide a class of distributions for decreasing marginal values, called the ordered
decreasing values model, which satisfies our single-crossing assumptions on Φ. Similarly, an
ordered increasing values model satisfies the single-crossing condition on Φ.
To our knowledge, the function Φ is new to this literature. However, horizontal single-
3The buyer’s marginal valuations (or type) for the two units are v1 ∈ [0, 1] and v2 ∈ [0, a].
2
crossing of Φ is equivalent to a sufficient condition introduced by McAfee and McMillan
(1988). A version of Φ may be useful in proving the optimality of deterministic mechanisms
in other settings, such as the sale of heterogenous objects.
Related Literature: Early work on mechanism design with multidimensional types
includes Rochet (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1988), Wilson (1993), Armstrong (1996),
and Rochet and Chone´ (1998). As these papers focused primarily on divisible products,
existence of deterministic mechanisms was not an issue.
Thanassoulis (2004), Manelli and Vincent (2006), Manelli and Vincent (2007), Pycia
(2006), Pavlov (2011), and Hart and Reny (2015) investigate the sale of indivisible, het-
erogenous objects with independent values that are additive. As already noted, it may be
optimal to randomize in this setting. Moreover, as Hart and Reny (2015) show, revenue may
not be monotone in the distribution of the buyer’s type. Correlation between marginal values
adds another layer of complexity and may increase the desirability of randomization. In a
model with two heterogenous goods and correlated values, Hart and Nisan (2019) show that
mechanisms of bounded menu size, such as deterministic mechanisms, may yield a negligible
fraction of the optimal revenue.
The sale of homogenous objects is analyzed by Malakhov and Vohra (2009) and by
Devanur et al. (2020). These models differ from ours in that buyers have the same privately
known value for all units, but the number of units desired is privately known. Pavlov (2020)
investigates a model in which buyers buy one of two heterogenous objects, each of which has
two units with the same value to the buyer.
Apart from Malakhov and Vohra (2009) and Devanur et al. (2020), two other papers
obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal mechanisms that are deterministic.
Manelli and Vincent (2006) obtain sufficient conditions in a model with two heterogenous
goods with independent, additive values. Haghpanah and Hartline (2020) obtain sufficient
conditions for bundling to be optimal in a general model.
When there are two or more buyers, Chen et al. (2019) provide sufficient conditions for
the existence of optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms that are deterministic.
However, these conditions do not apply to our setting, where there is one buyer, or to
dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Daskalakis et al. (2017) and Kleiner
and Manelli (2019) characterize optimality for a multi-product monopolist using duality
theory.
3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We investigate the decreasing marginal
values model in Section 2. After presenting an example in which it is optimal to randomize
over the first unit, we show in Section 2.1 that it is optimal to sell the first unit determin-
istically. Line mechanisms are characterized in Section 2.2 and the existence of an optimal
mechanism that is deterministic is established in Section 2.3. Necessary conditions for a
deterministic optimal mechanism are presented in Section 2.4. A special case of decreasing
marginal values, the ordered decreasing model, is introduced in Section 2.5. Our results for
increasing marginal values are in Section 3. All proofs are in an Appendix.
2 Decreasing Marginal Values
We begin with an example with identical objects and decreasing marginal values in which it
is optimal to randomize.4
Example 1 There are two units and the buyer has three possible types, A, B and C. The
valuations of the three types and the probability distribution over types are provided below:5
Type (v1, v2) Probability
A (3, 1) 0.5
B (4, 3) 0.25
C (10, 1) 0.25
The candidates for a deterministic optimal mechanism are:6
Bundling. The three candidate optimal prices for the two units bundled together are
4, 7, and 11. The highest expected revenue (of 4) is achieved at bundle price 4. All
types buy the two units at this price.
Unbundling. The prices of the two units, p1 and p2, are strictly positive. The most
that can be earned by selling only to type C is 11
4
. The most that can be earned by
4Examples of optimal random mechanisms in the literature involve heterogenous objects.
5The example can be modified to a type space with continuous density as modeled in this paper.
6For simplicity, we assume that when a buyer is indifferent between two options, she chooses the option
the seller prefers. That is, the mechanism is seller favorable as defined in Hart and Reny (2015).
4
selling only to types B and C is 7
2
. Therefore, consider prices at which type A buys
either one or two units. If type A buys exactly one unit then p1 ≤ 3, p2 > 1 and
maximum revenue is 3.75 with p1 = 3, p2 = 3. If type A buys two units then p1 ≤ 3,
p2 ≤ 1 and maximum revenue is 4, which yields the bundling outcome.
Thus, the maximum expected revenue from a deterministic mechanism is 4. Consider the
following random mechanism.
Price Package
2
(
2
3
, 0
)
, i.e., sell unit 1 with probability 2
3
and unit 2 with probability 0
61
3
(1,1), i.e., sell both units with probability 1
With this menu, type A chooses the first option and pays 2. Types B and C choose the
second option and pay 61
3
. This generates an expected revenue of
2× 0.5 + 19
3
× 0.5 = 25
6
> 4.
Thus, randomization yields higher expected revenue than any deterministic mechanism. 
The Model
We describe a model with decreasing marginal values over two identical units of an
indivisible object. The buyer’s (marginal) value for the ith unit is vi, i = 1, 2. The joint
density function of v = (v1, v2) is f(v), which has support
D ≡ {(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, a] : v2 ≤ a v1}
Marginal values are decreasing if a ≤ 1, although this assumption is not necessary for any of
our results. We assume that density f(·) is strictly positive on its support and is absolutely
continuous. As the support of the marginal distribution of v2 depends on the realized value
of v1, the values v1 and v2 are not independent.
An allocation rule is a function q = (q1, q2), where qi : D → [0, 1], i = 1, 2 is the
(unconditional) probability that the ith unit is sold to the buyer. If buyer type (v1, v2)
obtains a second unit, then this buyer must also obtain the first unit. Therefore, the following
feasibility constraint is implied:
q1(v) ≥ q2(v), ∀v
5
A transfer is a function t : D → <, a payment by the buyer to the seller. A mechanism
is (q, t).
The payoff of a buyer who truthfully reports v is
u(v) ≡ v · q(v)− t(v)
A mechanism (q, t) is individually rational if u(v) ≥ 0 for all v; it is incentive compatible if
u(v) ≥ u(v′) + (v − v′) · q(v′), ∀v, v′
It is well-known (see Bo¨rgers (2015), for instance) that a necessary and sufficient condition
for incentive compatibility is that u(v) is a convex function and
qi(v) =
∂u(v)
∂vi
, a.e., i = 1, 2
Thus
t(v) = 5u(v) · v − u(v), a.e.
The seller’s expected revenue is
Rev(q, t) ≡ E[t(v)] =
∫
D
[
5 u(v) · v − u(v)
]
f(v)dv (1)
The integral of the first term in the integrand is the expected welfare from the mechanism.
Subtracting the expected payoff of the buyer yields the seller’s expected revenue.
A mechanism (q∗, t∗) is optimal if it is incentive compatible (IC) and individually ratio-
nal (IR), and for any other IC and IR mechanism (q′, t′) we have
Rev(q∗, t∗) ≥ Rev(q′, t′)
It is easy to show that in any optimal mechanism (q∗, t∗)
q∗(v) = (0, 0) =⇒ t∗(v) = 0
Thus, in an optimal mechanism, the payoff of a buyer type who received zero units is zero.
A mechanism (q, t) is deterministic if its allocation rule is deterministic, i.e., qi(v) ∈ {0, 1}
for all v and i. If a mechanism is not deterministic, it is random. A random mechanism (or
allocation rule) is a lottery over deterministic mechanisms (or allocation rules).
Let Q be the set of IC and IR mechanisms. If mechanisms (qa, ta) and (qb, tb) are IC
and IR then so is λ(qa, ta) + (1 − λ)(qb, tb), λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, Q is a convex set. The set Q
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is compact.7 Therefore, as the expected revenue is a continuous, linear functional of q, it is
maximized at an extreme point of Q. When two or more indivisible objects are for sale, the
extreme points of Q may be random mechanisms. This contrasts with the sale of one object
to one buyer, where all extreme points of the set of IC, IR mechanisms are deterministic.
Hence, a deterministic optimal mechanism always exists when a single object is sold to a
buyer but a random mechanism might be optimal if two or more objects are sold.
Heterogenous objects
Our results apply to the sale of two heterogenous objects when one of the two objects
can be sold only after the other object is sold. Here are two scenarios.
– After a decision to purchase a product, the buyer might be offered a related product
or service. For instance, after purchasing a new car the buyer might also purchase an
extended warranty. Such add-on sales fit our model.
– A seller who offers two versions of a product, basic or premium. The buyer’s value for
the basic product is v1 and for the premium product is v1 + v2.
8
2.1 The First Unit is Sold Deterministically
In Proposition 1 below, we show that under a sufficient condition on the density, there exists
an optimal mechanism in which the first unit is sold deterministically. The following lemma
is required for the proposition. The proof, which is in the Appendix, is similar to that of
a result in McAfee and McMillan (1988); however, our assumption of decreasing marginal
values yields a simpler expression for expected revenue.
Lemma 1 The seller’s expected revenue from an IC and IR mechanism (q, t) is
Rev(q, t) =
a∫
0
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2 −
a∫
0
1∫
v2
a
u(v1, v2)
[
3f(v1, v2) + (v1, v2) · 5f((v1, v2))
]
dv1dv2
7See Manelli and Vincent (2007) for a proof of compactness of the set of mechanisms for the sale of
heterogenous objects. A similar proof applies for the case of homogenous objects considered in this paper.
8The additional value a buyer places on a premium product might be more than the value for a basic
product, v2 > v1. This is admissible in our model as we do not assume a ≤ 1.
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The following condition on density, introduced by McAfee and McMillan (1988), is often
invoked in the multidimensional mechanism design literature.
The density f satisfies Condition SC-H if 3f(v) + v · 5f(v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ D.
In the single-object case, Condition SC-H becomes 2f(v) + v df(v)
dv
≥ 0, which (i) is equiv-
alent to the assumption that the expected revenue, v[1 − F (v)], is concave and (ii) implies
that Myerson’s virtual value function satisfies single crossing.9 As shown next, under SC-H
the first unit is allocated deterministically in an optimal mechanism.10
Proposition 1 If the density function f satisfies Condition SC-H, then there exists an op-
timal mechanism (q, t) in which q1(v) ∈ {0, 1} for all v.
Lemma 1 implies that if, for any IC and IR mechanism (q, t), it is possible to decrease
u(v1, v2) when v1 < 1, without decreasing u(1, v2) and Condition SC-H is satisfied, then
expected revenue increases. Proposition 1 is proved by making such decoupled changes in u
in a mechanism in which the first unit is allocated randomly to some buyer types, thereby
creating a new IC and IR mechanism with greater expected revenue. The proof is similar
to the proof of Proposition 2 in Pavlov (2011), who showed that in the unit-demand case
and in the additive, heterogenous objects case, there is an optimal mechanism in which any
positive allocation belongs to the upper boundary of the feasible allocation set.
Remark 1: Proposition 1 holds if the seller’s costs c = (c1, c2) are positive with 1 > c2/a ≥
c1 ≥ 0 and Condition SC-H is modified to 3f(v) + (v − c) · 5f(v) ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ D.
Thus, under SC-H we may restrict our search for optimal mechanisms to those that
allocate the first unit deterministically. This reduces the dimensionality of the problem as
potentially optimal mechanisms are specified by a price for the first unit and an allocation
rule for types (1, v2) only. We refer to such potentially optimal allocation mechanisms as
line mechanisms.
9Condition SC-H is one of three conditions we impose on a function Φ that is defined in Section 2.3; SC-H
is a single-crossing assumption in the horizontal direction on Φ. Together, the three conditions imply the
existence of an optimal mechanism that is deterministic.
10If the inequality in SC-H is strict, then in any optimal mechanism q1(v) ∈ {0, 1} for almost all v.
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2.2 Line Mechanisms
Let Y ≡ {(1, v2) : v2 ∈ [0, a]} be the one-dimensional subset of the type space along the
v2-axis.
Definition 1 A mechanism (q, t) is a line mechanism if
i. its restriction to Y is IC and IR
ii. for every (1, v2) ∈ Y , q1(1, v2) = 1
iii. for every v ≡ (v1, v2) ∈ D \ Y ,
(
q1(v), q2(v), t(v)
)
=
(0, 0, 0), if v1 + v2q2(1, v2) < t(1, v2)(1, q2(1, v2), t(1, v2)), otherwise.
The first unit is allocated deterministically in a line mechanism, with types (1, v2) obtaining
the first unit with probability one. A type (v1, v2) is allocated (q1(1, v2) = 1, q2(1, v2), t(1, v2))
if it is IR; otherwise type (v1, v2) gets (0, 0, 0). Thus,
u(v1, v2) = max
[
0, v1 + v2q2(1, v2)− t(1, v2)
]
= max
[
0, u(1, v2)− (1− v1)
]
(2)
Lemma 2 Every line mechanism is IC and IR on D.
For any IC and IR mechanism, the proof of Proposition 1 constructs a line mechanism
which generates at least as much expected revenue. Hence, we have the following corollary
to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 If the density function f satisfies Condition SC-H, then there is an optimal
mechanism that is a line mechanism.
Corollary 1 simplifies the problem significantly, as a line mechanism is completely de-
scribed by t(1, 0), the payment by type (1, 0) (i.e., the price for the first unit), and q2(1, v2),
the allocation rule for the second unit for types with v1 = 1. However, the problem does
not become one-dimensional. Two line mechanisms with the same allocation rule on Y will
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have different allocation rules on D if the prices for the first unit are different in the two
mechanisms. Moreover, the set of line mechanisms is not convex.
The Structure of Line Mechanisms
For any line mechanism (q, t), define
Z0(q, t) := {(v1, v2) : u(1, v2)− (1− v1) < 0}
Eq. (2) implies that the set of buyer types who do not receive any units in the line mech-
anism is Z0(q, t). The closure of Z0(q, t) consists of (v1, v2) such that u(v1, v2) = 0. A line
mechanism is shown in Figure 1.
0 1
a
(α; aα)
t(1; 0)
(v1; v2)
(1; v2)
t(v1; v2) = t(1; v2)
q1(v1; v2) = 1
q2(v1; v2) = q2(1; v2)
@Z0(q; t) : v1 + u(1; v2) = 1
Z0(q; t)
Figure 1: A line mechanism
For any line mechanism (q, t), define
α ≡ {x ∈ [0, 1] : u(1, ax)− (1− x) = 0} (3)
That α exists and is unique follows from 1 + u(1, a) ≥ 1, u(1, 0) ≤ 1, and the fact that
x + u(1, ax) is strictly increasing and continuous in x. The dependence of α on (q, t) is
suppressed in the notation. From (3) we have
α = 1− u(1, aα) ≤ 1− u(1, 0) = t(1, 0) (4)
The upper boundary of Z0(q, t) is
∂Z0(q, t) := {(v1, v2) : u(1, v2)− (1− v1) = 0}
10
0 1
a
(α; aα)
t(1; 0)
Z0(q; t)
Figure 2: A constrained line mechanism
Note that ∂Z0(q, t) is a curve with slope − 1q2(1,v2) (see Lemma 8 in Appendix A.2 for a
proof) that connects the points (t(1, 0), 0) and (α, aα). A deterministic mechanism is a
line mechanism in which ∂Z0(q, t) is piecewise linear with (at most) two line segments, one
vertical and the other with slope −1.
The next result further limits the search for an optimal mechanism to a subset of line
mechanisms defined next. For a line mechanism (q, t), let
q¯2 :=
supv2<aα
[
q2(1, v2)
]
, if α > 0
0, if α = 0
Definition 2 A line mechanism (q, t) is a constrained line mechanism if
either (i) q2(1, aα) = q¯2 and for all v2 > aα, q2(1, v2) ∈ {q¯2, 1}
or (ii) q2(1, aα) = 1.
If q¯2 = 1 then (i) and (ii) mean the same thing. Thus, in a constrained line mechanism
for v2 ≥ aα the probability of allocating the second unit takes at most two values, one of
which may be less than 1 (see Figure 2); if there is a discontinuity in q2(1, v2) at v2 = aα,
then q2(1, aα) = 1. However, for v2 < aα any (incentive compatible) value for q2 is possible.
Lemma 3 If the density function f satisfies Condition SC-H, then there exists an optimal
mechanism which is a constrained line mechanism.
Lemma 3 is proved by showing that there is an optimal mechanism which is an extreme
point of a convex, compact subset of line mechanisms. As we are maximizing a linear function
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on this subset, the maximum is attained at an extreme point. Every extreme point of the
subset is a constrained line mechanism.
Remark 2: From Definition 2, we conclude that if in a constrained line mechanism q¯2 = 0
then the mechanism is deterministic as q2(1, v2) = 0, ∀v2 < aα and q2(1, v2) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀v2 ≥
aα. Therefore, in the sequel we restrict attention to constrained line mechanisms in which
q¯2 > 0. This, and the definition of q¯2, implies α > 0 and therefore (4) implies t(1, 0) > 0.
2.3 Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms
In this section, we provide conditions under which there is an optimal mechanism that is
deterministic.
It is useful to split the expected revenue of a constrained line mechanism (q, t) into two
parts,
Rev(q, t) = Revα−(q, t) + Revα+(q, t)
where Revα−(q, t) is the expected revenue from types v2 ≤ aα and Revα+(q, t) is the
expected revenue from types v2 > aα. Define for every (v1, v2),
Φ(v1, v2) := f(1, v2)−
1∫
v1
[
3f(x, v2) + (x, v2) · ∇f(x, v2)
]
dx
Note that the function Φ depends only on f and not on any mechanism. The role of Φ is
discussed after the next lemma.
Lemma 4 If (q, t) is a constrained line mechanism, then
Rev(q, t) = Revα−(q, t) + Revα+(q, t),
where
Revα−(q, t) :=
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 (5)
Revα+(q, t) :=
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 −
a∫
aα
(1− v2
a
− u(1, v2))Φ(v2
a
, v2)dv2 (6)
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As noted immediately after Proposition 1, decreasing u(v1, v2) when v1 < 1 and increasing
u(1, v2) increases expected revenue (provided Condition SC-H is satisfied). These decoupled
changes in u are not possible in constrained line mechanisms. Whenever u(1, v2) is increased,
u(v1, v2) either increases or stays the same (see (2)). Thus, in a constrained line mechanism
the net change in expected revenue by increasing u(1, v2), and the consequent increase in
u(v1, v2), may be positive or negative. This trade-off is captured by the function Φ (which
we reiterate is independent of the mechanism and is only a function of the density).
To see the role of Φ, consider a constrained line mechanism (q, t) with buyer payoff u(1, ·)
for types in Y . First, consider v2 ≤ aα. Differentiating Revα−(q, t) with respect to u(1, v2),
we see from (5) that if
Φ(1− u(1, v2), v2) > 0
then increasing u(1, v2) increases expected revenue. This is the process of “straightening”
described later. If, instead,
Φ(1− u(1, v2), v2) < 0
then decreasing u(1, v2) increases expected revenue. This is the process of “covering” a
mechanism described later. The single-crossing property SC-V, introduced below, allows
changes in u(1, v2) for a range of v2 ≤ aα in a manner that preserves incentive compatibility.
Similarly, differentiating Revα+(q, t) with respect to u(1, v2), we see from (6) that for
v2 > aα if u(1, v2) is increased [decreased] when Φ(
v2
a
, v2) > 0 [Φ(
v2
a
, v2) < 0], then the
expected revenue increases. The single-crossing property SC-D, introduced below, allows
changes in u(1, v2) for a range of v2 > aα in a manner that preserves incentive compatibility.
Thus, Φ indicates the direction of revenue improvements, if any, for an arbitrary mecha-
nism. Consider the following single-crossing properties of Φ in the horizontal, vertical, and
diagonal directions in the type space:
Definition 3 The density function f satisfies Condition SC if
SC-H: Φ is increasing in v1
SC-V: for every v1, Φ(v1, ·) crosses zero at most once (from above). That is, for all (v1, v2)[
Φ(v1, v2) > 0
]
=⇒
[
Φ(v1, v
′
2) > 0, ∀ v′2 < v2
]
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SC-D: for every v2,
∫ a
v2
Φ(y
a
, y)dy crosses zero at most once (from below). That is, for all v2
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy ≥ 0
]
=⇒
[ a∫
v′2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy ≥ 0, ∀ v′2 > v2
]
Note that SC-H is equivalent to 3f(v) + v · ∇f(v) ≥ 0 for all v. Further, SC-V is implied if
Φ is decreasing in v2 and SC-D is implied if Φ(
y
a
, y) satisfies single crossing. In Section 2.5,
we provide a class of distributions that satisfy Condition SC.
These restrictions on the prior yield our main result.
Theorem 1 If the density function f satisfies Condition SC, then there is an optimal mech-
anism that is deterministic.
The proof consists of two steps.
• Step 1. SC-H implies that there is an optimal mechanism that is a constrained line
mechanism (Lemma 3). In a constrained line mechanism, q2(1, v2) takes at most two
values for v2 ≥ aα but may take any number of values for v2 < aα. Under SC-H and
SC-V, Proposition 2 in Section 2.3.1 shows that there is an optimal mechanism which
is semi-deterministic; that is, a constrained line mechanism in which q2(1, v2) takes at
most three values for v2 ∈ [0, a], and only one of these three values is strictly between
0 and 1.11
• Step 2. If SC holds, a deterministic line mechanism is optimal in the class of semi-
deterministic line mechanisms, completing the proof of Theorem 1.
In the next section, we explain Step 1 in some detail. The proof of Step 2 is in Ap-
pendix A.3.
2.3.1 Optimality of Semi-deterministic Mechanisms
We show that under SC-H and SC-V there exists an optimal mechanism that is semi-
deterministic.
11In a deterministic mechanism, for any v2, q2(1, v2) is either 0 or 1.
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0 1
a
(α; aα)
t(1; 0)
Z0(q; t)
(1; q2(1; aα))
v2
v¯2
(1; q2(1; v2))
Figure 3: v2 and v¯2 in a constrained line mechanism
For a constrained line mechanism (q, t), define
v2 := inf{v2 ∈ [0, 1] : q2(1, v2) > 0} (7)
v¯2 := sup{v2 ∈ [0, 1] : q2(1, v2) < 1}
As IC implies that q2(1, v2) is increasing in v2, we have v2 ≤ v¯2 with equality only if (q, t) is
a deterministic mechanism. Figure 3 illustrates v2 and v¯2 for the case v2 < aα < v¯2.
Consider the following definition:
Definition 4 A constrained line mechanism (qs, ts) straightens another constrained line
mechanism (q, t) at vs2 ∈ (v2, aα]12 if
us(1, v2) = u(1, v
s
2), ∀ v2 ≤ vs2
us(1, v2) = u(1, v2), ∀ v2 ≥ vs2.
Note that (qs, ts) is completely specified by us(1, · ). Moreover,
ts(1, 0) = 1− u(1, vs2)
qs2(1, v2) =
0, if v2 < vs2q2(1, v2), if v2 ≥ vs2
as illustrated in Figure 4. By construction, α = αs and us(1, v2) ≥ u(1, v2) for all v2 < vs2. In
a straightening, the payoff of types (1, v2), v2 < v
s
2 increases compared to the payoff in (q, t).
Therefore, the price of the first unit is lower, ts(1, 0) < t(1, 0), and a buyer with v2 < v
s
2 is
never allocated a second unit. Consequently, Z0(q
s, ts) ( Z0(q, t).
12By Remark 2, we may assume that for small positive , q2(1, aα− ) > 0. Therefore, v2 < aα.
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a
(α; aα)
t(1; 0)
Z0(q; t)
(1; q2(1; aα))
v2
v¯2
vs2
@Z0(qs; ts)
Figure 4: Straightening a line mechanism
Lemma 5 Suppose that the density function f satisfies Conditions SC-H and SC-V. Con-
sider a constrained line mechanism (q, t). If
Φ(t(1, 0), v2) > 0,
then there exists a straightening (qs, ts) of (q, t), such that Rev(qs, ts) > Rev(q, t).
Consider the following definition.
Definition 5 A constrained line mechanism (q, t) is semi-deterministic if(
q1(v), q2(v)
)
∈
{
(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, q2(1, aα)), (1, 1)
}
∀ v ∈ D
Thus, in a semi-deterministic mechanism the menu size is no more than four.
By Lemma 5, Φ(t(1, 0), v2) ≤ 0 is a necessary condition for an optimal constrained line
mechanism (q, t). Under this condition, we show that the revenue of any constrained line
mechanism is no more than the revenue of its semi-deterministic cover, defined below.
Definition 6 A mechanism (qc, tc) is a cover of a constrained line mechanism (q, t) if
(qc, tc) is semi-deterministic and
αc = α (8)
tc(1, 0) = t(1, 0)
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uc(1, v2) ≤ u(1, v2), ∀ v2 < aα
uc(1, v2) = u(1, v2), ∀ v2 ≥ aα (9)
In a cover, the payoff of types (1, v2), v2 < aα decreases compared to the payoff in
(q, t). Several implications of the definition are worth noting. First, tc(1, 0) = t(1, 0) implies
uc(1, 0) = u(1, 0). Second, (2) and (9) imply that uc(v1, v2) = u(v1, v2) for all v2 ≥ aα.
Therefore, (8) and (9) imply qc2(1, aα) = q2(1, aα). As (q
c, tc) is semi-deterministic, we have
qc2(1, v2) ∈ {0, q2(1, aα), 1} for all v2. Thus, if q2(1, aα) = 1, then its cover is deterministic.
Figure 5 shows the boundaries of type sets where 0, 1, 1 + q2(1, aα) and 2 units are sold
in the cover (qc, tc) of a constrained line mechanism (q, t). Observe that (qc, tc) is the most
generous out of all semi-deterministic mechanisms that never allocate a unit when (q, t) does
not. That is, among all semi-deterministic mechanisms (q′, t′) such that if qi(v) = 0 for
any v, then q′i(v) = 0, we have q
c
i (v) ≥ q′i(v).
0 1
a
(α, aα)
t(1, 0)
vc2
∂Z0(q
c, tc)
∂Z0(q, t)
v¯2
(1, q2(1, aα))
(1, 1)
(1, 0)
Figure 5: Cover of a constrained line mechanism
The cover, (qc, tc), of a constrained line mechanism, (q, t), is constructed from Z0(q, t)
using two line segments: (i) a straight line with slope − 1
q2(1,aα)
at (α, aα) and (ii) a vertical
line at (t(1, 0), 0). The convexity of Z0(q, t) (see Lemma 8 in Appendix A.2) and the fact
that the slope of Z0(q, t) equals − 1q2(1,v2) , which is less than or equal to − 1q2(1,aα) , ensures that
Z0(q, t) ⊆ Z0(qc, tc) and therefore u(1, v2) ≥ uc(1, v2),∀v2 < aα. This construction gives us
(qc1(1, v2), q
c
2(1, v2)) :=

(
1, 0
)
, if v2 < v
c
2(
1, q2(1, aα)), if v
c
2 ≤ v2 < v¯2(
1, 1
)
, otherwise.
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where vc2 :=
1
q2(1,aα)
[
(1 + aq2(1, aα))α− t(1, 0)
]
. Note that v¯c2 = v¯2.
Lemma 6 Suppose that the density function f satisfies Conditions SC-H and SC-V. Con-
sider a constrained line mechanism (q, t). If
Φ(t(1, 0), v2) ≤ 0, (10)
then Rev(qc, tc) ≥ Rev(q, t) where (qc, tc) is the cover of (q, t).
This leads to the main result of this section.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the density function f satisfies Conditions SC-H and SC-V.
Then there exists an optimal mechanism that is semi-deterministic.
Proof: Condition SC-H and Lemma 3 imply that there is an optimal mechanism (q, t) which
is a constrained line mechanism. Therefore, Lemma 5 implies that (10) is satisfied for (q, t).
Let (qc, tc) be the (semi-deterministic) cover of (q, t). Hence, by Lemma 6
Rev(qc, tc) ≥ Rev(q, t) (11)
Hence, (qc, tc) is an optimal mechanism that is semi-deterministic. 
Proposition 2 is used in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.3.
2.4 Necessary Conditions for a Deterministic Optimal Mechanism
We provide necessary conditions for a deterministic mechanism to be optimal in the class
of all deterministic mechanisms. If Condition SC is satisfied, then these conditions are
necessary for optimality of a deterministic mechanism in the class of all mechanisms.
A deterministic mechanism is described by prices p1 and p2 for the two units. If at
optimality ap1 ≤ p2 then the derivation of optimal prices is straightforward. The optimal
price p∗i , i = 1, 2 is the price that maximizes the profit of a seller who sells one unit to a
buyer whose valuation for the object has probability density equal to the marginal density
of vi.
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Therefore, assume that ap1 > p2 and that p1, p2 are in the interior of the domain D, i.e.,
p1 ∈ (0, 1), p2 ∈ (0, ap1).13 The following necessary conditions are implied.
Proposition 3 If (p∗1, p
∗
2) are optimal prices in the interior of the domain D, then
p∗2∫
0
Φ(p∗1, v2)dv2 = 0 (12)
aα∗∫
p∗2
Φ((1 + a)α∗ − v2, v2)dv2 +
∫ a
aα∗
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 = 0 (13)
Further, Φ(p∗1, p
∗
2) ≤ 0 and Φ(p∗1, 0) ≥ 0.
2.5 Ordered Decreasing Values Model
We describe a model in which valuations are based on the order statistics of two draws from
the same distribution. Let X1, X2 be two i.i.d. random variables with cdf G(·) and density
function g(·) that is strictly positive on its support [0, 1]. Let
v1 = max{X1, X2}, v2 = amin{X1, X2}
Thus av1 ≥ v2. We call this an ordered decreasing values model. Note that
f(v1, v2) =
2
a
g(v1)g(
v2
a
), 1 ≥ v1 ≥ v2
a
≥ 0
This model is a natural generalization of the maximum game of Bulow and Klemperer (2002)
to two objects. In Bergemann et al. (2020)’s interpretation of the maximum game, the Xi’s
represent the values from the different ways of using the object; the buyer will put the object
to its best possible use. A similar interpretation applies to the ordered decreasing values
model, where, if the buyer obtains one unit of the object, she will deploy it in its best usage
and if she obtains two units, she will deploy them in the two best usages.
Another interpretation is that the buyer in the ordered decreasing values model is an
intermediary who resells the units to two final consumers. The seller does not have access
13The assumption that p1 ≤ 1 is without loss of generality because for every deterministic mechanism
(p1, p2) with p1 > 1, the prices (pˆ1, pˆ2), with pˆ1 = 1 and pˆ2 = p1 + p2 − 1, yield the same expected revenue
as (p1, p2).
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to the final consumers and can only sell the units to the intermediary. The final consumers
have unit demand, their values are i.i.d. and known to the intermediary. If the intermediary
purchases only one unit, she will resell it to the final consumer with a higher value.14
Let η(x) := x
g(x)
dg(x)
dx
be the elasticity of g. For every (v1, v2), define
W (v1, v2) := v1 − 1−G(v1)
g(v1)
[
2 + η(
v2
a
)
]
Wmin(v2) := v2 − 1−Gmin(v2)
gmin(v2)
,
where Gmin(v2) = 1 − (1 − G(v2))2 is the cumulative distribution function of the minimum
of two independent random variables drawn from G.
Definition 7 For every v1, W (v1, ·) crosses zero at most once (from above) if for
every v2 [
W (v1, v2) > 0
]
=⇒
[
W (v1, v
′
2) > 0 ∀ v′2 < v2
]
Wmin crosses zero at most once (from below) if for every v2
15[
Wmin(v2) ≥ 0
]
=⇒
[
Wmin(v
′
2) ≥ 0 ∀ v′2 > v2
]
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for the ordered decreasing model to
satisfy Condition SC.
Proposition 4 In an ordered decreasing model,
SC-H is satisfied if and only if η(x) ≥ −3
2
.
SC-V is satisfied if and only if W (v1, ·) crosses zero at most once for all v1.
SC-D is satisfied if and only if Wmin crosses zero at most once.
Examples of densities that satisfy the sufficient conditions of Proposition 4 include the
uniform family g(x) = αxα−1 with α > 0, g(x) = e
x
e−1 , and some Beta distributions.
14These two interpretations assume that a = 1.
15Note that this is the condition that density gmin satisfies the usual regularity condition. It is satisfied if
g has increasing hazard rate.
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Example 2 Uniform Distribution
We describe the optimal mechanism for a uniform distribution on the domain D = [0, 1] ×
[0, a]. The density is
f(v1, v2) =
 2a , if 1 ≥ v1 ≥ v2a ≥ 00, otherwise
It may be verified that there is an optimal solution (p1, p2) where prices satisfy ap1 >
p2. For a uniform distribution, Φ(v1, v2) =
6v1−4
a
which does not depend on v2. Thus,
Φ(2/3, v2) = 0 for any value of v2. Consequently p
∗
1 = 2/3 is the only solution to (12) and
it does not depend on the value of a. The unique prices in the interior of D that satisfy
necessary conditions (12) and (13) for an internal optimal solution are16
p∗1 =
2
3
, p∗2 =
1
3
(
2a−
√
a(1 + a)
)
Unbundled prices
A direct calculation reveals that the unique prices on the boundary of D that are a candidate
for an optimal solution are
p∗1 =
√
1 + a
3
, p∗2 = 0 Bundle price
As we are maximizing a continuous function on a compact set, an optimal solution exists,
Therefore, one of these two sets of prices is optimal. A calculation reveals that if a > 1
3
then the optimal prices (i.e., optimal mechanism among all deterministic mechanisms) are
the unbundled prices above. If, instead, a < 1
3
then it is optimal to sell the two units as a
bundle at the price
√
1+a
3
.
In the limit as a → 0, the buyer has positive value for one object only with density
f(v1) = 2v1. The limit of the optimal bundling price as a→ 0 is
√
1
3
, which is the optimal
price for selling one object to a buyer with density f(v1) = 2v1.
The optimal prices are shown in Figure 6a for a ≥ 1
3
and in Figure 6b for a < 1
3
.
That there is no random mechanism that yields greater expected revenue than these
deterministic mechanisms follows from our results. First, note that the uniform model is an
ordered decreasing values model with v1 = max{X1, X2} and v2 = amin{X1, X2}, where Xi
are i.i.d. uniform on [0, 1]. The uniform density on [0, 1] has elasticity 0 and has increasing
16Armstrong (2016) shows that these are optimal prices for the case a = 1.
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Figure 6: Optimal mechanism for uniform distribution.
hazard rate. Thus, the single-crossing conditions in Definition 7 are satisfied. By Proposi-
tion 4, Condition SC is satisfied and by Theorem 1 there is a deterministic mechanism that
is optimal. 
3 Increasing Marginal Values
We begin with an example with identical objects and increasing marginal values in which it
is optimal to randomize.
Example 3 The probability distribution of values is in the table below:
Type (v1, v2) Probability
A (6, 8) 0.1
B (3, 12) 0.9
There are two candidates for an optimal deterministic mechanism:
D1. Bundle the two units at a bundle price to 14. Each type buys the bundle, yielding an
expected revenue of 14.
D2. Offer unit 1 at price 6 (for type A) and the bundle at price 15 (for type B). This yields
a revenue of 6× 0.1 + 15× 0.9 = 14.1 > 14.
Hence, D2 is the optimal deterministic mechanism with a revenue of 14.1.
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Price Package
12 (1, 0.75), i.e., unit 1 with probability 1 and unit 2 with probability 0.75
15 (1,1), i.e. both units with probability 1
Consider the following randomized mechanism.
Type A chooses the first item in the menu and pays 12. Type B is indifferent between both
items and chooses the bundle at price 15. The expected revenue is 12 × 0.1 + 15 × 0.9 =
14.7 > 14.1. Hence, there is no optimal mechanism that is deterministic. 
The departure from the earlier model is that the domain of v is the following triangle
D := {(v1, v2) ∈ [0, a]× [0, 1] : v1 ≤ av2}.
The definitions of a mechanism and its properties remain as in section 2. In particular,
the constraint q1(v) ≥ q2(v), ∀v is imposed. The density function f has support D and is
assumed to be absolutely continuous.
The counterpart of Proposition 1 is the following.
Proposition 5 If the density function f satisfies Condition SC-H, then there exists an op-
timal mechanism in which q1(v) = q2(v) for all v.
There is an optimal mechanism in which probability of selling each unit is the same.17
In other words, the seller bundles the two units and sells them as one object. Hence, Riley
and Zeckhauser (1983) and Myerson (1981) imply the following:
Theorem 2 If the density function f satisfies Condition SC-H, then it is optimal to bundle
the two units and sell them at a take-it-or-leave-it price.
Thus, a deterministic mechanism is optimal in this model under weaker conditions than
in the model with decreasing marginal values.
Let T be the cdf and τ the density of w ≡ v1 + v2. If T is regular in the sense of Myerson
(1981), then the optimal bundle price solves B = 1−T (B)
τ(B)
.
17If there are n units, then the conclusion of Proposition 5 generalizes to “there exists an optimal mecha-
nism in which qn−1(v) = qn(v) for all v.”
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Ordered Increasing Values Model
This is the counterpart of the order decreasing values model. Let X1, X2 be two i.i.d.
random variables with density g(·) that is strictly positive on its support [0, 1]. Let v1 =
amin{X1, X2} and v2 = max{X1, X2}. Thus v1 ≤ av2. The following is a sufficient condition
for the regularity of T .
Lemma 7 Let v1 and v2 be from an ordered increasing values model. If g, the density of
Xi, has increasing hazard rate and η(x) ≥ −32 , then T is regular.18
Hence, Theorem 2 implies that the optimal mechanism for an ordered increasing values
model is to the sell the two units as a bundle under the conditions on g specified in Lemma 7.
A Two-period Model
As with decreasing marginal values, the results here also apply when there is an order
in which two objects can be sold. Consider a two-period model in which a durable product
may be sold either at the beginning of the first period or at the beginning of the second
period. If the product is sold in the first period, the buyer consumes it in both periods. If,
instead, it is bought in the second period, then only second-period consumption is possible.
It is convenient to number time by the number of periods left, including the current
period. Thus, the first period is period 2 and second period is period 1. If the buyer
purchases the product in period 2, she also consumes it in periods 2 and 1.
The buyer’s values are v1 for consumption in period 1 (the latter period) and v2 for con-
sumption in period 2 (the earlier period). The restriction v1 ≤ v2 follows from discounting.
Values for both the periods are known to the buyer at the beginning (no dynamics).
An allocation rule Q determines two things: Q1(v), the probability of selling the product
in period 1 (the latter period), and Q2(v), the probability of selling the product in period 2
(the earlier period), with the natural restriction that Q1(v)+Q2(v) ≤ 1. The expected value
to buyer type (v1, v2) from this allocation rule is
(v1 + v2)Q2(v) + v1Q1(v) = v1[Q1(v) +Q2(v)] + v2Q2(v)
Define q1(v) := Q1(v)+Q2(v) and q2(v) := Q2(v). So, q1(v) is the probability with which the
buyer consumes the product in the first period only and q2(v) is the probability with which
the buyer consumes the product in both periods, with q1(v), q2(v) ∈ [0, 1] and q1(v) ≥ q2(v).
18Recall that η is the elasticity of g.
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4 Discussion
There are several directions we hope to explore in future work. An obvious one is generalizing
the results to more than two units. Proposition 1 generalizes to the sale of n > 2 units as
follows. Suppose that there are n units for sale with D = {(v1, v2, . . . , vn)|0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤
vi ≤ aivi−1, i ≥ 2}. If the inequality in Condition SC-H is changed to
(n+ 1)f(v) + v · 5f(v) ≥ 0, for all v ∈ D,
then it is optimal to sell the first unit deterministically. A generalization of condition SC
would be required to obtain a fully deterministic optimal mechanism.
Another direction to build on our results would be to obtain optimal dominant-strategy
incentive compatible auctions. As noted on Remark 1, Proposition 1 generalizes to allow
for positive seller costs. With a modification of the definition of Φ to include seller costs,
Theorem 1 also generalizes. With two buyers, the seller’s cost for providing a unit to buyer A
is the lost revenue from buyer B. This may be useful in constructing optimal auctions.
The strategy of proofs developed in this paper may be useful in other models. Our
preliminary investigations indicate that the approach used here can be adapted to some
settings with heterogenous objects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Section 2.1
Proof of Lemma 1: From (1), the seller’s expected revenue is
Rev(q, t) =
∫
D
[
5 u(v) · v − u(v)
]
f(v)dv
=
∫ a
0
∫ 1
v2
a
[
5 u(v1, v2) · (v1, v2)− u(v1, v2)
]
f(v1, v2)dv1dv2
=
∫ 1
0
∫ av1
0
[
5 u(v1, v2) · (v1, v2)− u(v1, v2)
]
f(v1, v2)dv2dv1
Observe that
1∫
v2
a
∂u(v)
∂v1
v1f(v)dv1 = v1u(v)f(v)
∣∣∣∣1
v2
a
−
1∫
v2
a
u(v)
[
f(v) + v1
∂f(v)
∂v1
]
dv1
= u(1, v2)f(1, v2)− v2
a
u(
v2
a
, v2)f(
v2
a
, v2)
−
1∫
v2
a
u(v)
[
f(v) + v1
∂f(v)
∂v1
]
dv1
=⇒
a∫
0
1∫
v2
a
∂u(v)
∂v1
v1f(v)dv1dv2 =
a∫
0
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2 −
a∫
0
v2
a
u(
v2
a
, v2)f(
v2
a
, v2)dv2
−
a∫
0
1∫
v2
a
u(v)
[
f(v) + v1
∂f(v)
∂v1
]
dv1dv2
Similarly,
av1∫
0
∂u(v)
∂v2
v2f(v)dv2 = v2u(v)f(v)
∣∣∣∣av1
0
−
av1∫
0
u(v)
[
f(v) + v2
∂f(v)
∂v2
]
dv2
= av1u(v1, av1)f(v1, av1)−
av1∫
0
u(v)
[
f(v) + v2
∂f(v)
∂v2
]
dv2
=⇒
1∫
0
av1∫
0
∂u(v)
∂v2
v2f(v)dv2dv1 =
1∫
0
av1u(v1, av1)f(v1, av1)dv1
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−
1∫
0
av1∫
0
u(v)
[
f(v) + v2
∂f(v)
∂v2
]
dv2dv1
By a change of variable v2 = av1, we have
1∫
0
av1u(v1, av1)f(v1, av1)dv1 =
a∫
0
v2
a
u(
v2
a
, v2)f(
v2
a
, v2)dv2
Thus,∫
D
[5u(v) · v]f(v)dv =
a∫
0
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2 −
a∫
0
1∫
v2
a
u(v)
[
2f(v) + v · 5f(v)
]
dv2dv1
and
Rev(q, t) =
a∫
0
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2 −
a∫
0
1∫
v2
a
u(v)
[
3f(v) + v · 5f(v)
]
dv1dv2

Proof of Proposition 1: Condition SC-H and Lemma 1 imply that if u is modified to uˆ
(while maintaining IC and IR) such that
uˆ(1, v2) ≥ u(1, v2), ∀ v2 and uˆ(v1, v2) ≤ u(v1, v2), ∀(v1, v2) s.t. v1 < 1 (14)
then Rev(qˆ, tˆ) ≥ Rev(q, t).
Let (q, t) be any IC and IR mechanism. WLOG, assume that q(0, 0) = (0, 0), t(0, 0) = 0.
Let Y = {(1, v2) : v2 ≤ a}. Define
qˆ1(1, v2) = 1, qˆ2(1, v2) = q2(1, v2)
tˆ(1, v2) = t(1, v2) + (1− q1(1, v2))
and qˆ(0, 0) = (0, 0), tˆ(0, 0) = 0. In the mechanism (qˆ, tˆ), the probability of getting the first
unit is increased to 1 for types (1, v2) and the payment increased so as to leave such types
indifferent between (q, t) and (qˆ, tˆ). Extend (qˆ, tˆ) from Y ∪ {(0, 0)} to v ∈ D \ [Y ∪ {(0, 0)}]
as follows:(
qˆ1(v), qˆ2(v), tˆ(v)
)
=
(0, 0, 0), if v1 + v2qˆ2(1, v2) < tˆ(1, v2)(1, qˆ2(1, v2), tˆ(1, v2)), otherwise. (15)
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So, the range of (qˆ, tˆ) is {(0, 0, 0)} and the outcomes for types (1, v2) ∈ Y . Clearly, (qˆ, tˆ) is
IR on D \ Y .
In the mechanism (qˆ, tˆ), type (1, v2) obtains payoff equal to that in (q, t) as
uˆ(1, v2) = (1, v2) · qˆ(1, v2)− tˆ(1, v2)
= (1, v2) · q(1, v2) + (1− q1(1, v2))− [t(1, v2) + (1− q1(1, v2))]
= u(1, v2)
Thus, (qˆ, tˆ) is IR on Y . That (qˆ, tˆ) is IC on Y follows from
uˆ(1, v2)− uˆ(1, v′2) = u(1, v2)− u(1, v′2) ≥ (v2 − v′2)q2(1, v′2) = (v2 − v′2)qˆ2(1, v′2)
where the inequality follows from IC of (q, t).
We use the fact that (qˆ, tˆ) is IC on Y to prove that (qˆ, tˆ) is IC on D \ Y . Consider any
type (v1, v2) ∈ D \ Y . The payoff to this type from outcome (1, qˆ2(1, v′2), tˆ(1, v′2)) is
v1 + v2qˆ2(1, v
′
2)− tˆ(1, v′2) = (v1 − 1) + (v2 − v′2)qˆ2(1, v′2) + 1 + v′2qˆ2(1, v′2)− tˆ(1, v′2)
= (v1 − 1) + (v2 − v′2)qˆ2(1, v′2) + uˆ(1, v′2)
≤ (v1 − 1) + uˆ(1, v2)
= v1 + v2qˆ2(1, v2)− tˆ(1, v2),
where the inequality follows since (qˆ, tˆ) is IC for any (1, v2) ∈ Y . But v1 +v2qˆ2(1, v2)− tˆ(1, v2)
is the payoff of type (v1, v2) from the outcome (1, qˆ2(1, v2), tˆ(1, v2)). Hence, the payoff of type
(v1, v2) is maximized at the outcome (1, qˆ2(1, v2), tˆ(1, v2)). The payoff from this outcome is
v1 + v2q2(1, v2)− t(1, v2).
To summarize, if v1 + v2qˆ2(1, v2) < tˆ(1, v2), then type (v1, v2) strictly prefers (0, 0, 0) to
all other outcomes in the range of (qˆ, tˆ); otherwise, this type’s payoff is maximized at the
outcome (1, qˆ2(1, v2), tˆ(1, v2)). From (15) we see that (qˆ, tˆ) is IC on D \ Y .
Finally, the payoff of type (v1, v2) ∈ D \ Y that is allocated (1, qˆ2(1, v2), tˆ(1, v2)) in the
mechanism (qˆ, tˆ) is
uˆ(v1, v2) = uˆ(1, v2)− (1− v1)
= u(1, v2)− (1− v1)
≤ u(v1, v2) + (1− v1)q1(1, v2)− (1− v1)
= u(v1, v2)− (1− v1)(1− q1(1, v2))
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≤ u(v1, v2)
where the first inequality follows from the IC of (q, t) and the second from v1 < 1. If, instead,
(q1(v1, v2), q2(v1, v2), t(v1, v2)) = (0, 0, 0) then uˆ(v1, v2) = 0 ≤ u(v1, v2) by IR of (q, t).
Hence, uˆ(1, v2) = u(1, v2) for all (1, v2) ∈ Y and uˆ(v) ≤ u(v) for all v ∈ D \ Y . As
the conditions in (14) are satisfied, we conclude that Rev(qˆ, tˆ) ≥ Rev(q, t). Therefore, as
(q, t) was arbitrary, there is an optimal mechanism in which the allocation of the first unit
is deterministic. 
A.2 Proofs of Section 2.2
Proof of Lemma 2: Fix a line mechanism (q, t). By definition, q1(1, ·) = 1 and (q, t)
is IC and IR on Y . The rest of the proof is identical to the second part of the proof of
Proposition 1. 
The following lemma is needed in the sequel.
Lemma 8 For any line mechanism (q, t), the set Z0(q, t) satisfies the following properties.
i. Z0(q, t) is convex.
ii. Further, α ≤ t(1, 0) ≤ 1. If t(1, 0) = α, then q2(1, y) = 0 for all y ∈ [0, aα).
iii. The slope of the boundary ∂Z0(q, t) is − 1q2(1,v2) .
Proof:
i. Take v, v′ ∈ Z0(q, t) and let v′′ = λv + (1− λ)v′ for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
v′′1 + u(1, v
′′
2) = λv1 + (1− λ)v′1 + u
(
1, λv2 + (1− λ)v′2
)
≤ λv1 + (1− λ)v′1 + λu(1, v2) + (1− λ)u(1, v′2)
= λ(v1 + u(1, v2)) + (1− λ)(v′1 + u(1, v′2))
< 1
where the first inequality follows from the fact that u is convex and the second from the fact
that v, v′ ∈ Z0(q, t). Therefore, v′′ ∈ Z0(q, t).
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ii. That α ≤ t(1, 0) follows from (4) and t(1, 0) ≤ 1 follows from IR as u(1, 0) = 1 −
t(1, 0) ≥ 0. If α = t(1, 0), then u(1, 0) = u(1, aα) = u(1, 0) + ∫ aα
0
q2(1, y). As q2 is
non-negative, we must have q2(1, y) = 0 for all y ∈ [0, aα).
iii. Differentiating along the boundary, v1 + u(1, v2) = 1, we get
1 +
∂u(1, v2)
∂v2
dv2
dv1
= 1 + q2(1, v2)
dv2
dv1
= 0
=⇒ dv2
dv1
= − 1
q2(1, v2)

Proof of Lemma 3: We know that the buyer’s payoff u from any IC, IR mechanism (q, t)
satisfies ∇u = (q1, q2) a.e. WLOG we restrict attention to mechanisms with u(0, 0) = 0.
Therefore,
u(v1, v2) =
v1∫
0
q1(s1, 0)ds1 +
v2∫
0
q2(v1, s2)ds2
Thus, (1) implies that the expected revenue functional is linear in the allocation rule q.
Let (q∗, t∗) be a line mechanism that is optimal. We know from Corrolary 1 that such a
mechanism exists. Let Qα∗ be the set of line allocation rules that use q∗1 for allocating the
first unit and, for v2 < aα
∗, use q∗2 for allocating the second unit. That is,
Qα∗ := {q′ : q′1(v) = q∗1(v) for all v and q′2(v1, v2) = q∗2(v1, v2) for all (v1, v2) such that v2 < aα∗}
Hence, for every line mechanism (q′, t′) such that q′ ∈ Qα∗ , we have
t′(1, 0) = t∗(1, 0), α′ = α∗, and u′(1, v2) = u∗(1, v2), ∀ v2 ≤ aα∗
Recall that q¯2 = supv2<aα∗
[
q∗2(1, v2)
]
. Let Qα∗2 be the set of all increasing functions q′2(1, ·)
defined on [aα∗, a] such that q′2(1, aα
∗) ≥ q¯2 and q′2(1, a) ≤ 1. Any q′ ∈ Qα∗ maps to a
q′2 ∈ Qα∗2 and vice versa. Moreover, as (q∗, t∗) maximizes expected revenue in the class of all
IC and IR mechanisms, q∗2 must maximize expected revenue in Qα∗2 .19
The set Qα∗2 is convex as the convex combination of two increasing functions is increasing.
Moreover, Qα∗2 is compact in the L1-norm (see Bo¨rgers (2015), p. 16). As noted above, the
19That is, the mechanism corresponding to q∗2 must maximize expected revenue in the subset of mechanisms
corresponding to Qα∗2 .
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expected revenue functional is linear in q and therefore it is also linear in q′2 ∈ Qα∗2 . Hence,
the problem of maximizing expected revenue on the set Qα∗2 has a solution at an extreme
point of Qα∗2 . WLOG we may select the optimal (q∗, t∗) to be such that q∗2 is an extreme
point of Qα∗2 .
We argue that every extreme point q2 ∈ Qα∗2 satisfies q2(1, v2) ∈ {q¯2, 1} for all v2 ≥ aα∗.
Assume, instead, that q2(1, v2) ∈ (q¯2, 1) for some v2 ≥ aα∗. Define two line allocation rules
qˆ2, q˜2 ∈ Qα∗2 as follows
qˆ2(1, v2) =
2q2(1, v2)− q¯2, if 12(1 + q¯2) ≥ q2(1, v2)1, if q2(1, v2) > 12(1 + q¯2)
q˜2(1, v2) =
q¯2, if 12(1 + q¯2) ≥ q2(1, v2)2q2(1, v2)− 1, if q2(1, v2) > 12(1 + q¯2)
0
q¯2
1
2(1 + q¯2 )
aα
1
a
q2(1, v2)
qˆ2(1, v2)
q˜2(1, v2)
v2 →
Figure 7: Line allocation rules q˜2 and qˆ2
Both qˆ2(1, v2) and q˜2(1, v2) are increasing in v2 and take values between q¯2 and 1 (see
Figure 7). Hence, qˆ2, q˜2 ∈ Qα∗2 . As q2(1, v2) ∈ (q¯2, 1) for some v2 ≥ aα∗, we have qˆ2 6= q˜2 6= q2.
As q2 =
1
2
[qˆ2 + q˜2], q2 cannot be an extreme point of Qα∗2 .
Note that if q¯2 = 0 then all extreme points of Qα∗2 are deterministic mechanisms. 
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A.3 Proofs of Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 4: By Lemma 1,
Rev(q, t) =
a∫
0
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2 +
a∫
0
1∫
v2
a
u(v1, v2)
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2,
where ψ(v1, v2) :=
∫ 1
v1
[
3f(x, v2) + (x, v2) · ∇f(x, v2)
]
dx.
In a line mechanism,20 u(v1, v2) = max
[
0, v1 − (1− u(1, v2))
]
. In particular,
u(v1, v2) =
0, if v1 <
(
1− u(1, v2)
)
and v2 ≤ aα
v1 − (1− u(1, v2)), otherwise
As a result,
Rev(q, t) =
a∫
0
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2 (16)
+
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
u(v1, v2)
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
u(v1, v2)
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2
We simplify each of the three terms in (16) below.
The first term can be written as
a∫
0
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2 =
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
f(1, v2)dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
u(1, v2)f(1, v2)dv2
=
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
f(1, v2)dv1dv2 −
a∫
aα
(
1− v2
a
− u(1, v2)
)
f(1, v2)dv2
+
a∫
aα
(1− v2
a
)f(1, v2)dv2
=
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
f(1, v2)dv1dv2 −
a∫
aα
(
1− v2
a
− u(1, v2)
)
f(1, v2)dv2
20Although the lemma is stated for constrained line mechanism, it is true for any line mechanism.
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+a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
f(1, v2)dv1dv2
For the second term, use u(v1, v2) = v1 − (1− u(1, v2)) and ψ(1, v2) = 0 for all v2 to obtain
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
u(v1, v2)
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2
=
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
v1
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2 −
aα∫
0
(1− u(1, v2))
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2
=
aα∫
0
[
v1ψ(v1, v2)
]1
1−u(1,v2)
dv2 −
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
ψ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
aα∫
0
(1− u(1, v2))ψ(1− u(1, v2), v2)dv2
= −
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
ψ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
For the third term, again use u(v1, v2) = v1 − (1− u(1, v2)) to obtain
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
u(v1, v2)
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2
=
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
v1
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2 −
a∫
aα
(1− u(1, v2))
1∫
v2
a
∂ψ(v1, v2)
∂v1
dv1dv2
=
a∫
aα
[
v1ψ(v1, v2)
]1
v2
a
dv2 −
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
ψ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
(1− u(1, v2))ψ(v2
a
, v2)dv2
=
a∫
aα
(
1− v2
a
− u(1, v2)
)
ψ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 −
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
ψ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
For all (v1, v2), we have Φ(v1, v2) = f(1, v2) − ψ(v1, v2). Therefore, inserting the three
terms in (16), we get
Rev(q, t) =
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 −
a∫
aα
(1− v2
a
− u(1, v2))Φ(v2
a
, v2)dv2
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= Revα−(q, t) + Revα+(q, t)

Proof of Lemma 5: If two constrained line mechanisms (q, t) and (q′, t′) are identical for
v2 ≥ aα then α = α′, and u(1, v2) = u′(1, v2), ∀v2 ≥ aα. It follows from (6) that
Revα+(q, t) := Revα
′+(q′, t′) (17)
By assumption, Φ(1 − u(1, 0), v2) = Φ(t(1, 0), v2) > 0. The continuity of Φ and of u
implies that Φ(1 − u(1, vs2), vs2) > 0, where vs2 := v2 +  and  > 0 is small. As noted
in Remark 2, we assume q¯2 = sup
v<aα
[q2(1, v2)] > 0 without loss of generality. Therefore, (7)
implies that v2 < aα and we may take  small enough such that v
s
2 < aα. By SC-V,
Φ(1− u(1, vs2), v2) > 0, ∀v2 ∈ [0, vs2] (18)
Let (qs, ts) be a straightening of (q, t) at vs2. Thus, α = α
s and us(1, v2) ≥ u(1, v2),
∀v2 < vs2. Lemma 4, eq. (17), and us(1, v2) = u(1, v2), ∀v2 ≥ vs2 imply
Rev(qs, ts)−Rev(q, t) = Revα−(qs, ts)−Revαs−(q, t)
=
vs2∫
0
1−u(1,v2)∫
1−us(1,v2)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
=
vs2∫
0
1−u(1,v2)∫
1−u(1,vs2)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
≥
vs2∫
0
1−u(1,v2)∫
1−u(1,vs2)
Φ(1− u(1, vs2), v2)dv1dv2
> 0,
where the second equality follows from us(1, v2) = u(1, v
s
2) for all v2 ≤ vs2, the first inequality
from SC-H, and the second inequality from (18). 
Proof of Lemma 6: Observe that (10) and SC-V imply that
Φ(t(1, 0), v2) ≤ 0, ∀v2 ≥ v2 (19)
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Let (qc, tc) be the cover of (q, t). By the covering property, α = αc and u(1, v2) = u
c(1, v2),
∀v2 ≥ aα. Therefore, (17) implies Revα+(q, t) = Revαc+(qc, tc). This, together with
Lemma 4, implies
Rev(q, t)−Rev(qc, tc) = Revα−(q, t)−Revαc−(qc, tc)
=
aα∫
v2
1−uc(1,v2)∫
1−u(1,v2)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
≤
aα∫
v2
1−uc(1,v2)∫
1−u(1,v2)
Φ(1− uc(1, v2), v2)dv1dv2
=
aα∫
v2
[
u(1, v2)− uc(1, v2)
]
Φ(1− uc(1, v2), v2)dv2
≤
aα∫
v2
[
u(1, v2)− uc(1, v2)
]
Φ(1− uc(1, 0), v2)dv2
=
aα∫
v2
[
u(1, v2)− uc(1, v2)
]
Φ(t(1, 0), v2)dv2
≤ 0,
where the first inequality follows from SC-H, the second inequality from u(1, v2) ≥ uc(1, v2),
∀v2 < aα, SC-H and 1−uc(1, v2) ≤ 1−uc(1, 0), ∀v2, and the third inequality from u(1, v2) ≥
uc(1, v2), ∀v2 < aα and (19). 
Proof of Theorem 1: As f satisfies SC-H and SC-V, by Proposition 2 there is an optimal
mechanism which is semi-deterministic: (q, t) ≡ (t ≡ t(1, 0), q2(1, aα), v2, v¯2). If q2(1, aα) = 0
or 1, then (q, t) is deterministic. Therefore, assume that q2(1, aα) ∈ (0, 1). Figure 8 shows
such a semi-deterministic mechanism.
In this semi-deterministic mechanism,
u(1, v2) =

1− t, if v2 ≤ v2
1 + (v2 − v2)q2(1, aα)− t, if v2 ∈ [v2, aα]
1− α +
v2∫
aα
q2(1, y)dy, if v2 ∈ [aα, a],
(20)
where q2(1, y) = q2(1, aα) if y ∈ [aα, v¯2) and q2(1, y) = 1 if y ∈ [v¯2, a].
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0 1
a
(α, aα)
t ≡ t(1, 0)
v¯2
(1, q¯2)
(1, 1)
(1, 0)
v2 = aα− t−αq2(1,aα)
Figure 8: A semi-deterministic mechanism
From Lemma 4, we have
Rev(q, t) =
aα∫
0
1∫
1−u(1,v2)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 −
a∫
aα
(1− v2
a
− u(1, v2))Φ(v2
a
, v2)dv2
=
v2∫
0
1∫
t
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
aα∫
v2
1∫
t−(v2−v2)q2(1,aα)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
−
a∫
aα
(
1− v2
a
)
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 + (1− α)
a∫
aα
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 +
a∫
aα
[ v2∫
aα
q2(1, y)dy
]
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2
[Inserting u(1, v2) = 1− α +
∫ v2
aα
q2(1, y)dy from (20)]
=
v2∫
0
1∫
t
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
aα∫
v2
1∫
t−(v2−v2)q2(1,aα)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
−
a∫
aα
(
1− v2
a
)
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 + (1− α)
a∫
aα
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 +
a∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
q2(1, v2)dv2
[Changing the order of integration in the last term]
=
v2∫
0
1∫
t
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
aα∫
v2
1∫
t−(v2−v2)q2(1,aα)
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
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−
a∫
aα
(
1− v2
a
)
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 + (1− α)
a∫
aα
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 + q2(1, aα)
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2
+
a∫
v¯2
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2 (21)
As noted at the beginning of the proof, q2(1, aα) < 1. Then v¯2 > aα. Differenti-
ate Rev(q, t) with respect to q2(1, aα), changing α but not changing v¯2, v2, and t. As
q2(1, aα) < 1, we know from Definition 2 that q2(1, aα) = q¯2. Note that
dα
dq¯2
= −aα−v2
1+aq¯2
.
Using this and (21), we have
∂Rev(q, t)
∂q¯2
= a
dα
dq¯2
1∫
α
Φ(v1, aα)dv1 +
aα∫
v2
(v2 − v2)Φ
(
t− (v2 − v2q2(1, aα), v2
)
dv2
− a dα
dq¯2
1∫
α
Φ(v1, aα)dv1 + a
dα
dq¯2
(1− α)Φ(α, aα)− a dα
dq¯2
(1− α)Φ(α, aα)
− dα
dq¯2
a∫
aα
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 − aq2(1, aα) dα
dq¯2
a∫
aα
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 +
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2
=
aα∫
v2
(v2 − v2)Φ
(
t− (v2 − v2)q2(1, aα), v2
)
dv2 + (aα− v2)
a∫
aα
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2
+
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2
The first-order condition ∂Rev(q,t)
∂q¯2
= 0 implies
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2 = −
aα∫
v2
(v2 − v2)Φ
(
t− (v2 − v2)q2(1, aα), v2
)
dv2 − (aα− v2)
a∫
aα
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2
(22)
Consider two cases.
Case 1. Suppose
a∫
aα
Φ(v2
a
, v2)dv2 ≥ 0. Then, SC-D implies that
a∫
v2
Φ(y
a
, y)dy ≥ 0 for all
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v2 > aα. Hence, we get
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2 ≥ 0 (23)
Case 2. Suppose
a∫
aα
Φ(v2
a
, v2)dv2 < 0. Lemma 5 implies that Φ(t, v2) ≤ 0. Hence, SC-H and
SC-V imply that Φ
(
t− (v2− v2)q2(1, aα), v2
)
≤ 0 for all v2 ∈ [v2, aα]. This implies that the
right-hand side of (22) is positive. Hence, we have
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2 > 0
So, in both cases, (23) holds. Define a new mechanism (q′, t′) from (q, t) by increasing
q′2(1, v2) from q2(1, aα) < 1 to 1 for all v2 ∈ [aα, v¯2). Thus, v¯′2 = aα and everything else,
including α, v2, and t, remains as in (q, t). This only changes the last two terms of (21) and
hence, we have
Rev(q′, t′)−Rev(q, t) =
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2 − q2(1, aα)
v¯2∫
aα
[ a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy
]
dv2 ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from (23). Thus, the revenue from (q′, t′) is no less than that from
(q, t). Further, q′2(1, aα) = 1. Therefore, the cover of the mechanism (q
′, t′) is a deterministic
mechanism. As (q, t) is an optimal semi-deterministic mechanism by assumption, Lemma 5
implies that Φ(t, v2) ≤ 0. Hence, by Lemma 6, there is a deterministic mechanism (the cover
of (q′, t′)) which generates at least as much revenue as (q′, t′) which in turn generates at least
as much revenue as the optimal mechanism (q, t). 
A.4 Proof of Section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 3: A deterministic mechanism is a constrained line mechanism.
Therefore, use (5) and (6) to obtain the expected revenue from prices (p1, p2):
Rev(p1, p2) =
p2∫
0
1∫
p1
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
aα∫
p2
1∫
(1+a)α−v2
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2
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+a∫
aα
1∫
v2
a
Φ(v1, v2)dv1dv2 +
1 + a
a
a∫
aα
(v2 − aα)Φ(v2
a
, v2)dv2
where we use u(1, v2) = 1 + v2 − (1 + a)α for v2 ≥ aα.
As (1 + a)α = p1 + p2, we have
dα
dp1
=
dα
dp2
=
1
1 + a
The derivatives are well-defined as p1 and p2 are in the interior of the domain. The first-order
conditions at optimal prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) are
∂Rev(q, t)
∂p1
= −
p∗2∫
0
Φ(p1, v2)dv2 −
aα∗∫
p∗2
Φ((1 + a)α− v2, v2)dv2 −
∫ a
aα∗
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 = 0
∂Rev(q, t)
∂p2
= −
aα∗∫
p∗2
Φ((1 + a)α∗ − v2, v2)dv2 −
∫ a
aα∗
Φ(
v2
a
, v2)dv2 = 0
The second equation is (13). Inserting it in the first equation above yields (12).
That Φ(p∗1, p
∗
2) ≤ 0 follows from Lemma 5 as p∗1 = t(1, 0) and p∗2 = v2.
Finally, suppose that Φ(p∗1, 0) < 0. Then by SC-V, Φ(p
∗
1, v2) ≤ 0 for all v2. By continuity,
there is an  > 0 such that Φ(p∗1, v2) < 0 for all v2 < . Consequently, (12) is not satisfied.
Hence, Φ(p∗1, 0) ≥ 0. 
A.5 Proof of Section 2.5
Proof of Proposition 4: SC-H: For any (v1, v2),
a[3f(v) + v · ∇f(v)] = 6g(v1)g(v2
a
) + 2v1
dg(v1)
dv1
g(
v2
a
) + 2v2
dg(v2
a
)
dv2
g(v1)
= 2g(v1)g(
v2
a
)
[
3 +
v1
g(v1)
dg(v1)
dv1
+
v2
g(v2
a
)
dg(v2
a
)
dv2
]
= 2g(v1)g(
v2
a
)
[
3 + η(v1) + η(
v2
a
)
]
(24)
Hence, if η(x) ≥ −3
2
for all x, then SC-H holds. If, instead, η(x) < −3
2
for some x, then
SC-H is violated at v1 =
v2
a
= x.
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SC-V: For any (v1, v2),
aΦ(v1, v2) = 2g(1)g(
v2
a
)− 2g(v2
a
)
1∫
v1
[
3g(x) + x
dg(x)
dx
+ η(
v2
a
)g(x)
]
dx
= 2v1g(v1)g(
v2
a
)− 2g(v2
a
)
(
1−G(v1)
)(
2 + η(
v2
a
)
)
= 2g(v1)g(
v2
a
)
[
v1 − 1−G(v1)
g(v1)
(
2 + η(
v2
a
)
)]
= 2g(v1)g(
v2
a
)W (v1, v2) (25)
Thus, SC-V is equivalent to W (v1, ·) crosses zero at most once for all v1.
SC-D: For any y ∈ [0, a],
aΦ(
y
a
, y) = 2g(
y
a
)g(
y
a
)
[
y
a
− 1−G(
y
a
)
g(y
a
)
(
2 + η(
y
a
)
)]
,
Denoting y′ := y
a
, this simplifies to
aΦ(
y
a
, y) = 2[g(y′)]2
[
y′ − 1−G(y
′)
g(y′)
(
2 +
1
g(y′)
y′
dg(y′)
dy′
)]
= 2y′[g(y′)]2 − 4(1−G(y′))g(y′)− 2y′(1−G(y′))dg(y
′)
dy′
= −2d[y
′g(y′)(1−G(y′))]
dy′
+
d(1−G(y′))2
dy′
Hence, we get for all v2 ∈ [0, a]
a
a∫
v2
Φ(
y
a
, y)dy = 2v2g(v2)(1−G(v2))− (1−G(v2))2
= v2gmin(v2)− (1−Gmin(v2))
= gmin(v2)
[
v2 − 1−Gmin(v2)
gmin(v2)
]
= gmin(v2)Wmin(v2)
Thus, SC-D is equivalent to Wmin crosses zero at most once. 
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A.6 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 5: Given an IC and IR mechanism (q, t), construct another mecha-
nism (qˆ, tˆ) as follows. Let X := {(v1, 1) : v1 ∈ [0, a]}. We first define (qˆ, tˆ) on X. For each
v1 ∈ [0, a], let
qˆ1(v1, 1) := q1(v1, 1), qˆ2(v1, 1) := q1(v1, 1)
tˆ(v1, 1) := t(v1, 1) +
[
q1(v1, 1)− q2(v1, 1)
]
Thus, we keep the allocation probability of the first unit unchanged and increase the allo-
cation probability of the second unit to the maximum feasible. For every v ∈ D \ X, set
qˆ2(v) := qˆ1(v) and
(
qˆ1(v), tˆ(v)
)
:=

(0, 0), if (v1 + v2)qˆ1(0, 1) < t(0, 1)(
qˆ1(0, 1), tˆ(0, 1)
)
, if v1 + v2 < 1, (v1 + v2)qˆ1(0, 1) ≥ tˆ(0, 1)(
qˆ1(v1 + v2 − 1, 1), tˆ(v1 + v2 − 1)
)
, otherwise
We first show that (qˆ, tˆ) restricted to X is IC and IR. Note that for all (v1, 1) ∈ X,
uˆ(v1, 1) = (v1 + 1)q1(v1, 1)− t(v1, 1)−
[
q1(v1, 1)− q2(v1, 1)
]
= u(v1, 1) (26)
Hence, IR of (q, t) implies IR of (qˆ, tˆ) restricted to X. Similarly, IC of (q, t) implies for every
(v1, 1), (v
′
1, 1) ∈ X, we have
uˆ(v1, 1)− uˆ(v′1, 1) = u(v1, 1)− u(v′1, 1) ≥ q1(v′1, 1)(v1 − v′1) = qˆ1(v′1, 1)(v1 − v′1)
Next, we show that (qˆ, tˆ) is IC and IR of on D\X. Note that the range of this mechanism
is (0, 0, 0) and outcomes on X. The payoff of type (v1, v2) ∈ D \ X from the outcome for
type (v′1, 1) ∈ X is
(v1 + v2)qˆ1(v
′
1, 1)− tˆ(v′1, 1) = (v1 + v2 − v′1 − 1)qˆ1(v′1, 1) + uˆ(v′1, 1) (27)
= (v1 + v2 − 1)qˆ1(v′1, 1)− v′1qˆ1(v′1, 1) + uˆ(0, 1) +
v′1∫
0
qˆ1(x, 1)dx
= (v1 + v2 − 1)qˆ1(v′1, 1) + uˆ(0, 1)−
v′1∫
0
[
qˆ1(v
′
1, 1)− qˆ1(x, 1)
]
dx (28)
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where the second equality follows from IC of (qˆ, tˆ) on X. Now, consider two cases for
(v1, v2) ∈ D \X.
Case 1: If v1 + v2 − 1 < 0, then eq. (28) is maximized at v′1 = 0 (as IC of (q, t) implies
that qˆ1(v
′
1, 1) = q1(v
′
1, 1) is increasing in v
′
1). The payoff of type (v1, v2) from the outcome
for type (0, 1) is
(v1 + v2 − 1)qˆ1(0, 1) + uˆ(0, 1) = (v1 + v2)qˆ1(0, 1)− tˆ(0, 1)
If (v1 +v2)qˆ1(0, 1) < tˆ(0, 1), type (v1, v2) prefers the outcome (0, 0, 0) to the outcome for type
(0, 1). If v1 + v2 < 1 and (v1 + v2)qˆ1(0, 1) ≥ tˆ(0, 1), then type (v1, v2) prefers outcome for
(0, 1) to every other outcome on X and (0, 0, 0). Thus, if v1 + v2 < 1, type (v1, v2) ∈ D \X
cannot manipulate (qˆ, tˆ) and IR also holds.
Case 2: Consider the case when v1 + v2 ≥ 1. With v¯1 ≡ v1 + v2 − 1, we have
uˆ(v¯1, 1) = u(v¯1, 1) ≥ u(v′1, 1) + (v¯1 − v′1)qˆ1(v′1, 1) ∀ v′1 ∈ [0, a],
where the equality follows from (26) and the inequality follows from IC of (q, t). From (27),
u(v′1, 1) + (v¯1 − v′1)qˆ1(v′1, 1) is the utility of type (v1, v2) from the outcome for type (v′1, 1).
Hence, the outcome for (v¯1, 1) maximizes the utility of (v1, v2) among all outcomes of types
in X. Thus, (v1, v2) cannot manipulate (qˆ, tˆ).
So, (qˆ, tˆ) is IC and IR.
Finally, for every (v1, v2) ∈ D \X if uˆ(v1, v2) = 0 then u(v1, v2) ≥ uˆ(v1, v2) due to IR of
(q, t). Else, the outcome of (v1, v2) is the same as the outcome of type (v
′
1, 1) ∈ X, where
v′1 = max(v1 + v2 − 1, 0). IC of (q, t) implies
u(v1, v2) ≥ u(v′1, 1) + (v1 − v′1)q1(v′1, 1) + (v2 − 1)q2(v′1, 1)
≥ u(v′1, 1) + (v1 − v′1)q1(v′1, 1) + (v2 − 1)q1(v′1, 1)
= (v1 + v2 − v′1 − 1)qˆ1(v′1, 1) + uˆ(v′1, 1)
= uˆ(v1, v2),
where the second inequality follows from q1(v
′
1, 1) ≥ q2(v′1, 1) and v2 < 1, the first equality
from (26), and the second equality from (27).
Hence, we have proved
uˆ(v1, v2) = u(v1, v2) ∀ (v1, v2) ∈ X
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uˆ(v1, v2) ≤ u(v1, v2) ∀ (v1, v2) ∈ D \X (29)
Using integration by parts, as in the proof of Lemma 1, one can show that:
Rev(q, t) =
∫ a
0
u(v1, 1)f(v1, 1)dv1 −
∫ 1
0
∫ av2
0
u(v)
[
3f(v) + v · ∇f(v)
]
dv1dv2 (30)
Since f satisfies SC-H, (29) and (30) imply that Rev(qˆ, tˆ) ≥ Rev(q, t). 
Proof of Lemma 7: With v1 ≤ av2, we have
f(v1, v2) =
2
a
g(
v1
a
)g(v2)
Analogous to the derivation of (24), we have
a[3f(v1, v2) + (v1, v2) · ∇f(v1, v2)] = 6g(v1
a
)g(v2)
[
3 + η(
v1
a
) + η(v2)
]
Hence, if η(x) ≥ −3
2
for all x, then SC-H is satisfied.
Theorem 4.5.8 in Barlow and Proschan (1975) implies that v1, v2 have increasing hazard
rates. That v1 + v2 = X1 + X2 has increasing hazard rate follows from Corollary 1.B.39 in
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). Consequently, w = v1 + v2 is regular. 
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